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1 
THE UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL SPACE 
LAUNCH COMPETITIVENESS ACT: THE 
CREATION OF PRIVATE SPACE PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AND THE OMISSION OF THE RIGHT TO 
FREEDOM FROM HARMFUL INTERFERENCE 
INTRODUCTION  
In March 2004, the European Space Agency successfully launched the 
Rosetta Spacecraft from Kourou, French Guiana.1 Over $1.5 billion 
dollars, ten years, and four billion miles later, the Rosetta Spacecraft 
released a sophisticated 220-pound probe called the “Philae,” which 
landed on Comet 67P/Churyumov-Gerasimenko on November 12, 2014.2 
The landing on Comet 67P, the first of its kind, is one of the most recent 
technological advancements in space travel and exploration.3 During its 
year-long stay on Comet 67P, the Philae probe has drilled into the surface 
to collect samples, taken a series of photographs, and conducted a swath of 
experiments, all of which have provided never-before-seen data that has 
the potential to shed light on the origins of the universe.4 
Perhaps more important than the information gleaned from the Philae 
landing is the symbolic impact of the mission. The Philae landing 
 
 
 1. Warren E. Leary, Intricate European Mission Goes Hunting for a Comet, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
24, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/24/science/intricate-european-mission-goes-hunting-for-
a-comet.html; Kenneth Chang, Rosetta Spacecraft Set for Unprecedented Close Study of a Comet, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/science/space/rosetta-spacecraft-set-
for-unprecedented-close-study-of-a-comet.html.  
 2. Chang, supra note 1; Dave Gilbert, We Landed Twice: Philae Comet Probe May Have 
Bounced after Harpoon Failure, CNN (Nov. 12, 2014, 4:22 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/12/ 
world/comet-landing-countdown/index.html.  
 3. See Leary, supra note 1.  
 4. Gilbert, supra note 2 (“No one has ever gotten data like Rosetta has gotten. No one has ever 
been able to land on a comet the way Philae just did.”(quoting NASA chief scientist Ellen Stofan)); 
Matt Saccaro, The Philae Lander May Have Found the Origins of Life on Earth, NEWS MIC (Nov. 18, 
2014), http://mic.com/articles/104490/the-philae-lander-may-have-found-the-origins-of-life-on-
earth#.cAn2eKbFk (“The European Space Agency’s Philae probe has discovered organic molecules on 
Comet 67P . . . [f]inding organic materials on a comet could help determine the origins of life on Earth 
. . . .”). While Philae was the first manmade object to land on a comet, NASA landed a probe, entitled 
Shoemaker, on an asteroid in 2001. The Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous (NEAR) mission was 
designed to simply orbit and study the Near Earth Asteroid 433 Eros. However, toward the end of the 
mission NASA decided to attempt a last minute landing on the asteroid, despite the fact that the 
Shoemaker probe was never designed for a landing. The probe successfully landed on Eros 433, took 
the highest resolution images ever obtained of an asteroid, and provided information on the asteroid 
for two weeks after the landing. NEAR-Shoemaker, NASA, http://science.nasa.gov/missions/near/ (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2015).  
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establishes that humans possess—or will soon possess—the technology 
for extensive commercial enterprises in space. Specifically, proof of our 
ability to land on a comet makes the idea of landing on and potentially 
excavating an asteroid more realistic.5 Asteroids, comets’ similarly-
situated cousins,6 present potentially extraordinary incentives for mining 
and exploitation.7 There are three types of asteroids: rare “M-class” 
asteroids, which contain ten times as much metal as other asteroids; “S-
type” or stony asteroids; and “C-type” asteroids, which contain significant 
amounts of hydrated clay minerals.8 According to some estimates, certain 
“platinum-rich asteroids just 500 meters across could contain more than 
the entire known reserves of platinum group metals.”9 Additionally, 
because asteroids have very low gravity, the fuel required for landing and 
exiting is greatly diminished, making the potential cost of asteroid mining 
more palatable.10 Despite the tremendous amount of rare and precious 
minerals contained within asteroids, asteroid mining’s most valuable 
purpose may be derived from something that is already abundant on earth: 
 
 
 5. Kevin Hartnett, The Comet Landing as a Prelude to Asteroid Mining, BOSTON GLOBE (Nov. 
14, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/11/14/the-comet-landing-prelude-asteroid-
mining/WDUHGKNhsP3wLLPn6XT7qN/story.html (reporting that, according to David Gump, vice-
chairman of Deep Space Industries, a trip to an asteroid would be “much easier” than the trip to 67P 
mostly because asteroids are usually much closer to earth and would not require the ten-year journey 
that was the Rosetta mission).  
 6. Asteroids are “relatively small, inactive, rocky bod[ies] orbiting the Sun.” Near Earth Object 
Program: Frequently Asked Questions, NASA (Dec. 21, 2014), http://neo.jpl.nasa.gov/faq/. Comets 
are “relatively small, at times active, object[s] whose ices can vaporize in sunlight forming an 
atmosphere (coma) of dust and gas and, sometimes, a tail of dust and/or gas.” Id.  
 7. Hartnett, supra note 5 (“An asteroid 30 or 40 meters wide has more platinum on it than five 
years of platinum trading on earth . . . .” (quoting Eric Anderson, CEO of Planetary Resources)); Susan 
Thomas, Gold Rush in Space? Asteroid Miners Prepare, but Eye Water First, REUTERS (Nov. 21, 
2013) http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/21/us-space-mining-asteroids-idUSBRE9AK0JF 
20131121 (noting that asteroids can “yield significant amounts of precious metals like platinum, 
rhodium, iridium, rhenium, osmium, ruthenium, palladium, germanium and gold.”). Asteroid mining 
has been described as being “the main resource opportunity of the 21st century.” Marc Kaufman, The 
Promise and Perils of Mining Asteroids, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (Jan. 23, 2013), 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/130122-asteroids-mining-space-science/ (quoting 
Mark Sonter of Deep Space Industries). “We sit in a sea of resources so infinite they’re impossible to 
describe[.]” Id. (quoting Rick Tumlinson, Deep Space Industries company chairman).  
 8. William Steigerwald, New NASA Mission to Help Us Learn How to Mine Asteroids, NASA 
(Aug. 8, 2013), https://www.nasa.gov/content/goddard/new-nasa-mission-to-help-us-learn-how-to-
mine-asteroids. 
 9. Thomas, supra note 7.  
 10. Hartnett, supra note 5 (“The attraction begins with the fact that it’s extremely expensive to 
lift anything from earth into space because of the huge amounts of fuel needed to escape gravity. 
Asteroids, by contrast, have almost no gravity at all, which makes it easy, from a fuel perspective, to 
get on and off them.”). But note, while an asteroid’s relatively low gravity makes it easier to depart 
from it, it also makes it much more difficult to land on in the first place. Sarah Zhang, Asteroid Miners 
Can Learn a lot from Philae’s Bumpy Landing, WIRED (July 30, 2015) http://www.wired.com/ 
2015/07/asteroid-miners-can-learn-lot-philaes-bumpy-landing/ (“The extremely low gravity of near 
earth asteroids is, after all, both a challenge and their primary advantage in space travel.”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss1/8
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water.11 Water, extracted from hydrated clay minerals present on asteroids, 
can be harvested and turned into hydrogen rocket fuel, giving asteroids the 
potential to be deep space gas stations.12 Plans to mine asteroids are not 
entirely new, as evidenced by the formation of several companies looking 
to extract resources from space enterprises.13 
Until recently, potential space investors in the United States and 
internationally had no legal assurances that they would be able to reap the 
financial benefits of their investments.14 Specifically, no legal clarity 
existed as to whether commercial actors would be entitled to property 
rights in space resources.15 Reacting to this glaring need for regulation in 
the industry, Congress passed the U.S. Commercial Space Launch 
Competitiveness Act of 2015 (“USCSLC”)16 with the stated purpose to 
“promote the right of United States citizens to engage in commercial 
exploration for and commercial recovery of space resources.”17 The 
USCSLC guarantees commercial actors the rights to “possess, own, 
transport, use, and sell the asteroid resource or space resource” that has 
been “obtained” by the commercial entity.18 While the passage of the 
USCSLC goes a long way toward providing clarity for investors looking 
to begin asteroid mining enterprises,19 this type of legislation also presents 
 
 
 11. Steigerwald, supra note 8 (“Although these asteroids [C-type] currently have little economic 
value since water is so abundant on Earth, they will be extremely important if we decide we want to 
expand the human presence throughout the solar system.”).  
 12. Id. (“The other thing you can do with water is break it apart into its constituent hydrogen and 
oxygen, and that becomes rocket fuel, so you could have fuel depots out there where you’re mining 
these asteroids.”). Of course, water is also “a critical life-support item for a spacefaring civilization, 
and it takes a lot of energy to launch it into space. . . . With launch costs currently thousands of dollars 
per pound, you want to use water already available in space to reduce mission costs.” Id.  
 13. See Hartnett, supra note 5 (citing Deep Space Industries, Astrobotic, and Planetary Resources 
as companies that are currently engaged in the planning stages of asteroid exploitation missions). 
NASA also currently has plans to launch an “asteroid sample return mission, OSIRIS-REx (Origins, 
Spectral Interpretation, Resource Identification, Security and Regolith Explorer).” Steigerwald, supra 
note 8. 
 14. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Space of the H. Comm. on Sci., Space, and Tech., 113th 
Cong. 4 (2014) (written testimony of Joanne I. Gabrynowicz), http://joannegabrynowicz.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/Gabrynowicz-Final-Testimony-H.R.-5063.pdf (“Despite this relevant body of 
law there are ‘gaps’ in [U.S. space law] that will have to be raised by private sector asteroid resource 
exploration and utilization.”) [hereinafter Gabrynowicz testimony].  
 15. Id.; Letter from Henry Hertzfield, et al., Co-Chair of the Am. Branch, Int’l Law Ass’n, to 
Maj. Leader McCarthy, et al. at 2 (May 15, 2015) [hereinafter Letter from Henry Hertzfield].  
 16. U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act Pub. L. No. 114-90, 129 Stat. 704 
(2015) [hereinafter “USCSLC”]. The bill was previously known as the Spurring Private Aerospace 
Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act of 2015. H.R. 2262, 114th Cong. (2015) [hereinafter 
“SPACE Act.”] 
 17. USCSLC § 51302(a)(3).  
 18. Id. at § 51303.  
 19. Letter from Henry Hertzfield, supra note 15, at 2. “The bill provides a critically important 
element of legal certainty regarding property rights in asteroid resources. This will help companies like 
ours continue to unlock private support for resource exploration in space.” 161 Cong. Rec. H8185-01, 
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three main issues that will shape its practical impact. First, is giving 
commercial actors property rights to extracted resources consistent with 
international law? Second, how will the word “obtained” be defined and 
used in practice? Third, how will the right to “freedom from harmful 
interference”—as referenced in USCSLC20—be enforced and 
implemented in conjunction with the property rights outlined in the 
statutes?  
This Note will address all three questions in the following parts. Part I 
will analyze the USCSLC in terms of its compliance with international 
law, specifically as it pertains to the Outer Space Treaty,21 concluding that 
the USCSLC most likely complies with international law. Part II looks to 
other property law principles and analogous scenarios that seek to define 
the notion of “obtained” within the USCSLC. Part III examines how the 
right to “freedom from harmful interference” eroded in the legislative 
drafting process and how previous versions of the right may have 
functioned as a quasi-property right. The Note will also address the 
desirability and underlying fairness concerns of the proposed rights given 
to commercial actors extracting resources in space, finding that the bundle 
of rights given to commercial actors in space is a necessary first step in the 
development of the space industry as a whole.  
 
 
H8192 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2015) (letter from Chris Lewicki, CEO of Planetary Resources). The 
Congressional Record also lists “SpaceX; Virgin Galactic; Blue Origin; World View Enterprises; 
XCOR Aerospace: Mojave Air and Space Port; Planetary Resources; Moon Express; Spaceport 
America; Spaceport Camden, Georgia; Midland Development Corporation; Masten Space Systems; 
the Satellite Industry Association; and the Commercial Spaceflight Federation” as space companies 
who have expressed support for USCSLC. Id.  
 20. USCSLC § 51302(a)(3). 
 21. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Oct. 10, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410 [hereinafter the 
OST]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss1/8
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I. IS THE USCSLC CONSISTENT WITH THE UNITED STATES’ 
INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS?  
Does the conferral of property rights over extracted resources as 
established by the USCSLC comport with international law?22 The 
USCSLC guarantees that “[a] United States citizen engaged in commercial 
recovery of an asteroid resource or a space resource under this chapter 
shall be entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained.”23 
Other than the ambiguity surrounding the word “obtained,” which this 
Note will address in Part III, the proposed legislation straightforwardly 
approves commercial appropriation of asteroid resources. This Note will 
examine both the establishment of property rights in space resources and 
the right to freedom from harmful interference for the rights’ compliance 
with international law.  
To answer this question, one must first turn to the Outer Space Treaty 
(“OST”). Created in the midst of the space race, it is the most relevant 
treaty dealing with the appropriation of space resources.24 The OST “is 
very often perceived as a ‘Constitution’ for outer space.”25 Concerns over 
space imperialism were the main impetus for the central provision of the 
OST: the principle of nonappropriation of space by Nation-States.26 
Article II of the OST states, “[o]uter space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of 
sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”27 
 
 
 22. Gabrynowicz testimony, supra note 14, at 8 (noting that, in regards to treaty obligations, 
“[i]n the absence of agreement legal opinion, opinio juris, is divided regarding the ownership status of 
extracted space resources.”) (footnote omitted); USCSLC § 51303 (describing the allocation of 
property rights).  
 23. USCSLC § 51303.  
 24. See Timothy Nelson, Mining Outer Space: Who owns the Asteroids?, 254 N.Y. L.J. 19 
(2015). 
 25. Virgiliu Pop, WHO OWNS THE MOON? EXTRATERRESTRIAL ASPECTS OF LAND AND MINERAL 
RESOURCES OWNERSHIP 36 (Prof. R. Jakhu et al. eds., 2009).  
 26. Id. at 60–61; Gabrynowicz testimony supra note 14, at 6; Brandon C. Gruner, A New Hope 
For International Space Law: Incorporating Nineteenth Century First Possession Principles into the 
1967 Space Treaty for the Colonization of Outer Space in the Twenty-First Century, 35 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 299, 317 (2004) (“The 1967 Space Treaty prohibits any country from asserting sovereignty 
over any celestial body, thereby eradicating global international rivalry as a key ingredient in space 
exploration. The intent of the 1967 Space Treaty’s authors was to eliminate outer space from the 
galvanized sphere of Cold War politics . . . .”) (footnote omitted).  
 27. OST art. II. There is some debate over the definition of “celestial bodies” and whether 
asteroids can be considered a non-appropriable celestial body in the first place. There are several 
academic theories for defining celestial bodies. However, some asteroids and comets “with the 
appropriate technology . . . could be moved; and they can be destroyed, i.e. consumed in their totality. 
Thus, they may qualify as movables.” Pop, supra note 25, at 51. Therefore, in many respects, asteroids 
themselves may be more akin to a resource than a body.” In other words, whether a space object can 
be considered a celestial body may be dependent on its ability to be moved. Id. For a full discussion on 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Additionally, Article I of the OST states, “[t]he exploration and use of 
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried 
out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their 
degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of 
all mankind.”28 The United States and one hundred other states have 
ratified the treaty and an additional twenty-five have signed it.29  
Taken together, it is clear that the OST precludes any claim over 
territorial rights in space of any kind.30 What is less clear, however, is 
whether the appropriation of space resources is consistent with the OST,31 
as the OST does not explicitly mention the extraction or ownership of 
space resources.32 Some scholars argue that the property rights guaranteed 
by the USCSLC might violate Article II of the OST because authorizing 
the private appropriation of space resources is tantamount to enabling 
national appropriation under the OST.33  
However, the concern that the USCSLC will violate the OST does not 
hold under closer scrutiny for several reasons. First, if the OST was meant 
to preclude private property rights in space resources, then it would have 
contained an explicit section prohibiting individual actors from claiming 
resources. “[U]nder international law states may do whatever is not 
expressly forbidden. ‘Restrictions upon the independence of States 
cannot…be presumed.’”34 Furthermore, “[t]he long-accepted legal 
doctrine expressio unius est exclusio alterius says that, when interpreting 
statutes, we should presume things not mentioned were excluded by 
deliberate choice, not inadvertence.”35 Therefore, the very fact that the 
OST does not directly deal with the appropriation of space resources is 
 
 
the different attempts to define celestial body and whether asteroids fall within that definition, see id at 
51–58. For the purposes of this Note, it is assumed that asteroids are non-appropriable celestial bodies.  
 28. OST art. I.  
 29. See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcomm., Status of International 
Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space as of 1 January 2015, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.105/C.2/2015/CRP.8 (Apr. 8, 2015). 
 30. Gabrynowicz testimony, supra note 14, at 7 (“The treaty regime is clear that appropriation of 
territory is prohibited.”); Nelson, supra note 24 (“Together, these articles mean that space cannot be 
subdivided into national ‘colonies,’ in the manner of 19th century European powers.”).  
 31. Gabrynowicz testimony, supra note 14, at 8 (“What remains unclear is the ownership status 
of the resources when they are collected.”).  
 32. Id. at 7. 
 33. See id. at 8–9; Letter from Henry Hertzfield, supra note 15, at 2–4.  
 34. Wayne N. White Jr., Presentation at the 40th Colloquium on the Law of Space of the 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics: Real Property in Outer Space (Oct. 6–10, 1997), 
http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/real_property_rights_in_outer_space.shtml 
 (quoting Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7)).  
 35. Alan Wasser & Douglas Jobes, Space Settlements, Property Rights, and International Law: 
Could a Lunar Settlement Claim the Lunar Real Estate it Needs to Survive?, 73 J. AIR L. & COM. 37, 
47 (2008).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss1/8
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strong evidence that it does not preclude it. Some also argue that when the 
OST says “the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for 
exploration and use by all states,” the signatories were implicitly giving 
permission for States to extract resources from celestial bodies.36  
The second reason that the OST does not prohibit private resource 
extraction derives from the distinction between authorizing individuals to 
reap the benefits of obtained resources and giving those same individuals 
rights to the land itself.37 Guarantees of private ownership of extracted 
resources do not “in any manner, claim sovereignty over a celestial body 
or portions of outer space; it only provides for rights for private entities to 
use the resources on a celestial body (specifically asteroids).” 38 If the bills 
allowed for the claiming of unextracted resources, then there would be a 
strong argument that the bill was akin to giving land rights.39 While the 
definition of “obtained” has the potential to be interpreted in a variety of 
ways, the words “obtained” and “unextracted” are almost certainly 
mutually exclusive.40  
Third, the United States’ refusal to sign the Agreement Governing the 
Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (“Moon 
Agreement”) is demonstrative of the fact that U.S. officials interpreted the 
OST as permissive of private resource extraction enterprises.41 The Moon 
Agreement was a treaty designed to fill in gaps in international space law 
and, in particular, address the ownership of space resources.42 The 
agreement, however, was impeded by ideological differences, and the 
U.S., along with ultimately all other space-faring nations, withdrew from 
the agreement because it was too collectivist.43 As a result, the treaty was 
 
 
 36. OST art. I (emphasis added); Letter from Henry Hertzfield, supra note 15, at 2–3.  
 37. Nelson, supra note 24 (“But there is a difference between appropriation of territory . . . and 
appropriation of mineral resources, as occurs in commercial mining-and OST says nothing in 
particular about the latter.”).  
 38. Letter from Henry Hertzfield, supra note 15, at 2. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at 2. (“The words of the bill are ‘resources obtained,’ leaving the unknown technical 
details to be specified in the future when they can be better defined and a process can be developed for 
regulatory actions as needed. In any event, ‘obtained’ is inconsistent with ‘unextracted.’”).  
 41. Nelson, supra note 24.  
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. (“Under this treaty, all lunar mining activities would have been carried out under the 
supervision of an international licensing body. In addition, the Moon Agreement stipulated that the 
moon (and all celestial bodies) were ‘the common heritage of mankind’-an expression that, for some, 
reflected a socialized/collectivist mind-set.”) (footnotes omitted); Agreement Governing the Activities 
of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, G.A. Res. 34/68, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/68 art. 11(5) 
(Dec. 5, 1979) (declaring that the international body shall also “govern the exploitation of the natural 
resources of the moon as such exploitation is about to become feasible”); see also id. art 11(7)(d) 
(stating that the body will mandate “[a]n equitable sharing by all States Parties in the benefits derived 
from those resources . . . .”); Richard B. Bilder, A Legal Regime for the Mining of Helium-3 on the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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seen as having the potential to “doom any private investment directed at 
space resource exploration.”44 Since the United States actively avoided 
limitations on the potential for private space resource enterprises, it 
necessarily believed that pre-existing obligations allowed for the private 
extraction of resources in the first place. In other words, it has always been 
the unofficial U.S. position that the OST allows for private resource 
extraction; a myriad of statements by U.S. officials in discussions over 
whether to ratify the Moon Agreement corroborated this notion.45 
Additionally, the scholarship community is beginning to reach a consensus 
that property rights in extracted resources are permitted by the OST.46  
A final, if not less significant, argument why the USCSLC is compliant 
with international law comes from a provision in the USCSLC itself that 
seeks to directly address potential concerns of a violation of the OST. 
Congress, clearly cognizant of the concerns that the USCSLC could be 
 
 
Moon: U.S. Policy Options, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 243, 269 (2010) (“[T]he Moon Agreement has, 
over a considerable period, gained few adherents, none of which are significant space powers.”).  
 44. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies: 
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate Comm. on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 12, 219–20 (1980) (statement of 
Alexander Haig, President, United Technologies Corp. Future Secretary of State); Alan Duane 
Webber, Note, Extraterritorial Law on the Final Frontier: A Regime to Govern the Development of 
Celestial Body Resources, 71 GEO. L.J. 1427, 1436–37 (1983) (“[t]he developing countries 
interpret[ed the concept] to embody the principle that celestial body resources are the common 
property of all the nations, and to require international control of celestial body resources for the 
purpose of redistributing wealth and technology among nations.”) (footnote omitted).  
 45. U.S. Government officials have consistently interpreted the OST as not prohibiting rights to 
extracted space resources. See Letter from Secretary of State Vance to Sen. Church, Chairman of 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Nov. 28, 1979, reprinted in Agreement Governing the Activities 
of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation, August 1980, at 313 (stating that the OST’s ban on appropriation is only applicable to 
stagnant bodies and that the OST would allow for the ownership of extracted space resources); 
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space of the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation on Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies, 96th Cong.) 2–19 (1980) (oral and written testimony of State Dep’t Legal 
Advisor Owen) (“American companies will have a continuing legal right to exploit the Moon’s 
resources. . .”; “once [resources] have been extracted from the Moon, ownership can be asserted at that 
point. . .”; “The United States took the position from the outset that such exploitation should be 
permitted, that such ownership after extraction should be permitted. And that. . .is an authoritative 
interpretation. . .”). 
 46. Matthew Schaefer, Property Rights in Space (Part II):Post-NewSpace Conference Thoughts-
Posey ASTEROIDS Act, Bigelow Payload Safety Review, On-Orbit Jurisdiction, Etc., LAW OF 
SCHAEFER (July 26, 2014) http://lawofschaefer.com/ (summarizing the consensus of the academic 
conference that “[r]esources extracted from lunar bodies and asteroids can be brought back to Earth 
and utilized and sold and ‘owned’ in that sense. There should be no debate over this. . . . Indeed, the 
[ASTEROIDS] act should specifically state that the granting of a property interest in extracted 
resources is consistent with international law.”); Letter from Henry Hertzfield, supra note 15, at 4 
(“The Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act is in complete compliance with all existing 
international obligations of the United States.”); Pop, supra note 25, at 136 (noting that the view that 
the OST precludes appropriation of extraterrestrial resources is no longer current).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss1/8
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construed as being an assertion of sovereignty,47 added an express 
disclaimer to the bill stating that the legislation is not intended to make 
any such assertion.48 The disclaimer reads: “[i]t is the sense of Congress 
that by the enactment of this Act, the United States does not thereby assert 
sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the 
ownership of, any celestial body.”49 While a congressional declaration that 
the USCSLC is not an assertion of extraterritorial sovereignty will likely 
not impact how other nations perceive the underlying reality of the new 
law, it does convey that the United States believes its interpretation of the 
statute comports with the OST.  
II. USING ANALOGOUS PROPERTY LAW PRINCIPLES TO DEFINE “OBTAINED” 
IN THE USCSLC  
The future of space travel and exploration will largely depend on the 
involvement of the private sector.50 NASA consistently struggles with 
funding,51 and since the space shuttle was retired in 2011, NASA has been 
solely reliant on Russian rockets to travel to the International Space 
Station.52 NASA’s solution to this problem is to more heavily rely on 
private companies for space travel by contracting with companies like 
Boeing and SpaceX.53 Furthermore, private companies can often take more 
 
 
 47. Gabrynowicz testimony, supra note 14, at 10.  
 48. USCSLC § 403.  
 49. Id.  
 50. Joel Achenback, Which Way to Space? Flights of Fancy may Launch the Industry’s Future, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2013/11/23/which-way-to-
space/ (referring to NASA as “Old Space” and private companies as “New Space”: “If there’s one 
thing that New Space has going for it, it’s that Old Space is in trouble. Old Space and New Space turn 
out to be symbiotic. New Space companies need NASA contracts, and NASA needs New Space 
companies to pick companies to pick up the agency’s slack.”).  
 51. While NASA is “perennially underfunded,” that distinction may start to change as: 
Congress wants to give the agency more money than it asked for . . . [t]he omnibus spending 
bill would give the US space agency close to $19.3 billion for next year. That exceeds the 
Obama administration’s budget request of $18.5 billion for NASA and provides the agency 
with $1.27 billion more than it received for 2015. 
Loren Grush, Congress Wants to Give NASA $19.3 Billion Next Year, Even More than Obama Asked 
For, THE VERGE (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.theverge.com/2015/12/16/10289030/nasa-budget-
increase-2016-congress-funding.  
 52. NASA: Seats on Russian Rockets Will Cost U.S. $490 Million, CBSNEWS (Aug. 6, 2015), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/nasa-seats-on-russian-rockets-will-cost-u-s-490-million/.  
 53. Ross Wilkers, NASA Selects Orbital ATK, Sierra Nevada, SpaceX for Round 2 Space Station 
Resupply Contracts, GOVCONWIRE (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.govconwire.com/2016/01/nasa-
selects-orbital-atk-sierra-nevada-spacex-for-round-2-space-station-resupply-contracts/ (“NASA has 
awarded Orbital ATK. . ., Sierra Nevada and SpaceX a second round of potential multi-billion dollar 
contracts to deliver cargo to and from the International Space Station through 2024 in support of 
efforts to end U.S. reliance on Russia for access to space by 2017.”).  
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risks, be more ambitious, and innovate more than government agencies.54 
In order for investors and private citizens to be willing to make the 
enormous financial investment that space exploration and utilization 
requires,55 it is absolutely imperative to create sufficient incentives for 
private companies to expand and embark upon space activities.56 
Attempting to define the term “obtained” within the meaning of the statute 
is tantamount to asking: At what point do property rights in space 
resources attach to the actor? As a result, defining “obtained” will 
establish a procedure for securing property rights, which in turn could 
shape whether and how private companies go about securing space 
resources.57  
When attempting to interpret a statutory term, the best place to start is 
the legislative context. The full statutory text that guarantees property 
rights to asteroid resources reads:  
[a] United States Citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an 
asteroid resource or a space resource under this chapter shall be 
entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained, 
 
 
 54. Cost reduction is one area that is especially ripe for innovation by private companies such as 
SpaceX. “SpaceX has learned. With industry veterans and outsiders, they benefit from past 
experiences but are unconstrained by forces and factors that pushed up NASA costs.” Tom Agan, 
What SpaceX Can Teach Us About Cost Innovation, HARV. BUSINESS REV. (Apr. 25, 2013), 
https://hbr.org/2013/04/what-spacex-can-teach-us-about. SpaceX is on the verge of accomplishing in 
six years of existence what NASA has never been able to manage: the ability “to provide low-cost 
space flight—that was the failed promise of the Space Shuttle—a reusable spacecraft to avoid the 
expensive building of a new craft for each mission.” Id. SpaceX has now successfully returned their 
Falcon 9 rocket to earth after launching a satellite into orbit. The Falcon 9 is intact and ready for future 
missions. Kenneth Chang, SpaceX Successfully Lands Rocket After Launch of Satellite into Orbit, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/22/science/spacex-rocket-landing.html. 
 55. Steigerwald, supra note 8 (“However, it currently costs hundreds of millions to billions of 
dollars to build and launch a space mission, so innovations that would make these costs fall 
dramatically are needed before it is profitable to mine asteroids . . . .”).  
 56. Incentivizing commercial activity in space is the clear objective of the USCSLC. In addition 
to being named the United States Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, the preceding bill 
was similarly titled the Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness Act of 2015. See USCSLC, supra 
note 16; SPACE Act, supra note 16. Furthermore, proponents of the legislation have said that “space 
commercialization, this bill, is the future of space. This bill will encourage the private sector to build 
rockets, to take risks, and to shoot for the heavens.” 161 Cong. Rec. H3514 (daily ed. May 21, 2015) 
(statement of Representative Smith). See generally John Adolph, The Recent Boom in Private Space 
Development and the Necessity of an International Framework Embracing Private Property Rights to 
Encourage Investment, 40 INT’L LAW. 961 (2006).  
 57. Lauren E. Shaw, Asteroids, The New Western Frontier: Applying Principles of the General 
Mining Law of 1872 to Incentivize Asteroid Mining, 78 J. AIR L. & COM. 121, 124 (2013) 
(“Implementing a scheme that offers ownership of extracted resources without bestowing complete 
sovereignty is necessary to avoid an impending legal limbo. . . . If private sector miners of asteroids 
know this right already exists, they will have more incentive to extract resources. This, in turn, would 
increase the chances of successful missions, resulting in numerous scientific and explorative benefits 
. . . .”) 
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including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid 
resource or space resource obtained in accordance with applicable 
law, including the international obligations of the United States.58 
While the USCSLC does contain definitions for “space resources” and 
“asteroid resources,” the term “obtained” is never defined in the proposed 
legislation.59 Furthermore, the only report compiled for either piece of 
legislation contains no discussion of what “obtained” means in connection 
with the statute or the possible implications of defining “obtained” in 
different ways.60  
The USCSLC concludes its guarantee of property rights in space 
resources by saying that the resource must be “obtained in accordance 
with applicable law, including the international obligations of the United 
States.”61 By doing so, Congress explicitly recognized that any property 
rights allocated to U.S. citizens must be reconciled with both domestic 
precedent and international policy obligations. Therefore, to better 
understand space regulations intended to comport with international and 
domestic precedent, it is prudent to analogize the USCSLC and space law 
generally to other property rights paradigms that deal with similar issues.62 
The high seas and Antarctica, by virtue of being far away, hard to reach, 
extra-national, and mineral-rich locations, are the two most commonly 
cited property regimes for informing and understanding space policy.63 
A. UNCLOS and the Law of the High Seas 
The high seas are particularly useful for the purposes of this 
comparison because, as is the case with space resources in the OST, sea-
bed resources are viewed as “the common heritage of mankind, the 
 
 
 58. USCSLC § 51303.  
 59. “The term ‘asteroid resource’ means a space resource found on or within a single asteroid.” 
Id. at § 51301(1). “The term ‘space resource’ means an abiotic resource in situ in outer space [and] 
includes water and minerals.” Id. at 51301(2)(A)–(B).  
 60.  H.R. Rep. No. 114-119 (2015).  
 61. USCSLC § 51303. 
 62. See generally Rosanna Sattler, Transporting a Legal System for Property Rights: From the 
Earth to the Stars, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 23 (2005) (analyzing how Antarctic property law and ocean 
property law regimes could inform new space policy); Testimony of Gabrynowicz, supra note 14, at 8 
(using the high seas and Antarctica to inform her interpretation of the SPACE Act’s property 
provisions); Nelson, supra note 24 (using the 1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral 
Resource Activities and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea as analogous legislation to “the 
legal status of mining in remote, extra-national areas such as outer space”); Timothy G. Nelson, The 
Moon Agreement and Private Enterprise: Lessons from Investment Law, 17 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
393 (2010) (comparing potential space property law with the Sea-Bed Regime and the Antarctic 
Mineral Resources Treaty).  
 63. See supra note 62.  
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exploration and exploitation of which shall be carried out for the benefit of 
mankind as a whole.”64 On the high seas, “it is long settled law that title to 
fish extracted from the ocean passes to the extracting entity.”65 
Furthermore, international agreements generally prohibit restrictions on 
high seas fishing; the Convention on the Law of the Sea declares, “[a]ll 
States have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high 
seas.”66 UNCLOS, the single most important piece of international law 
governing the ocean,67 also provides regulations on sea-bed mining and 
mineral extraction.68  
As an initial matter, the guarantee of property rights in UNCLOS 
seems to incorporate many of the same characteristics of the property 
guarantee in the USCSLC.69 UNCLOS says, “[t]itle to minerals shall pass 
upon recovery in accordance with this Convention.”70 This guarantee is 
very similar to the USCSLC’s that U.S. citizens “shall be entitled to any 
asteroid resource or space resource obtained.”71 However, language in 
UNCLOS provides a helpful clarification to its guarantee of property 
rights where the USCSLC remains silent: “[p]rospecting shall not confer 
on the prospector any rights with respect to resources. A prospector may, 
however, recover a reasonable quantity of minerals to be used for 
testing.”72 The implications of this clarification are that, at least for sea-
bed mining, the extraction of samples for testing purposes in a given area 
that contains resources is not sufficient to confer property rights over the 
 
 
 64. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea pmbl., 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (Dec. 10, 1982) 
[hereinafter “UNCLOS”]; OST art. XI.  
 65. Gabrynowicz testimony, supra note 14, at 8. 
 66. UNCLOS art. 116. 
 67. Peter Prows, Tough Love: The Dramatic Birth and Looming Demise of UNCLOS Property 
Law (And What is to be Done About it), 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 241, 243 (“[T]he 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea . . . represents the culmination of thousands of years of international 
relations, conflict, and now nearly universal adherence to an enduring order for ocean space. Its 
adoption marked the most significant achievement for international law since the U.N. Charter . . . .”). 
 68. UNCLOS Annex III. It is also important to note that while the United States has never 
ratified UNCLOS, it nonetheless is an adherent to the fundamental policies in the convention and 
therefore the convention still serves as a useful comparison for property rights in asteroid resources. 
Christopher Mirasola, Why the US Should Ratify UNCLOS: A View from the South and East China 
Seas, HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. (Mar. 15, 2015), http://harvardnsj.org/2015/03/why-the-us-should-ratify-
unclos-a-view-from-the-south-and-east-china-seas/ (“[M]uch of UNCLOS is based on customary 
principles of international law to which the U.S. already adheres . . . .”). The discussion over UNCLOS 
coincided with and fell victim to the same problems that plagued the Moon Agreement. Part XI of the 
convention established the creation of an international authority that would regulate mining operations. 
Seen as potentially hindering private US business interests, the Reagan Administration refused to 
ratify the treaty, and it has gone unratified to this day. See Nelson, supra note 24.  
 69. UNCLOS Annex III. 
 70. Id. art. 1.  
 71. USCSLC § 51303. 
 72. UNCLOS Annex III, art. 2. Prospecting is defined as the “search for mineral deposits in a 
place, especially by means of experimental drilling and excavation.” Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss1/8
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underlying resources. The precedent set by UNCLOS, if adapted and used 
to interpret the language in the USCSLC, would mean that if a commercial 
entity managed to land on an asteroid and retrieve samples from it, the 
entity’s only property rights would be in the material that was actually 
removed from the asteroid.73 There would be no property rights to the 
underlying resources.74 
B. CRAMRA and Antarctic Mining Provisions 
Antarctica, “[l]ike the moon, Mars, and asteroids . . . is also a vast 
expanse of land that is undeveloped and contains mineral deposits,” and is 
therefore also a useful comparison point for space law regimes.75 
Antarctica is governed by a series of treaties known together as the 
Antarctic Treaty System.76 “While the structure of the Antarctic treaty . . . 
would seem to be an ideal model [for space law] given its widespread 
acceptance and substantive provisions, it fails to deal with a crucial aspect 
of space development—the mining of minerals.”77 As a result, the “present 
situation is that all mineral resource activities, except scientific research, 
are prohibited under Article 7 of the Protocol on Environmental Protection 
 
 
 73. This interpretation could have relatively immediate implications as at least two space mining 
companies, Planetary Resources and Deep Space Industries, are making plans to begin asteroid 
prospecting and sampling. Caitlin O’Keefe, How We Choose Our Near-Earth Asteroid Targets, 
PLANETARY RESOURCES (Aug. 28, 2015) http://www.planetaryresources.com/2015/08/how-we-
choose-our-asteroid-targets/ (“Right now, we are building the Arkyd rendezvous prospectors—highly 
capable, low cost spacecraft . . . .”); Prospecting, DEEP SPACE INDUSTRIES, https://deepspace 
industries.com/prospecting/ (“Deep Space Industries will soon launch its first prospecting missions, 
using advanced, small spacecraft . . . to explore and study Near Earth Asteroids . . . .”); See also 
Kaufman, supra note 7 (“Prospecting using miniaturized ‘cubesat’ probes the size of a laptop will 
begin by 2015, company executives [for Deep Space Technologies] announced. They plan to return 
collections of asteroid samples to Earth not long after.”).  
 74. UNCLOS provides one possible interpretation of the “obtained” language in the USCSLC. 
The advantages and disadvantages of such a policy will be discussed further in Part V.  
 75. Sattler, supra note 62, at 32. Sattler also notes that “[t]he development and utilization of 
Antarctica, like the development of these celestial bodies, is expensive, requires great technical 
innovations, and provides unique challenges to humans working in that environment.” Id.  
 76. The treaties that make up the Antarctic Treaty System are: Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 
U.S.T. 794; Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, Oct. 10, 2003, 17 
U.S.T. 996; Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, 29 U.S.T. 441; and 
Convention and Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May 20, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476.  
 77. Sattler, supra note 62, at 33. The treaty system “regulates scientific study, provides for the 
exchange of information between parties, and provides guidelines for other management operations. 
Several provisions address the handling of waste and the protection of native species. The Treaty 
System also provides crucial guidelines for the safety and rescue of humans on Antarctica.” Id. 
(footnotes omitted). The reason that the Antarctic Treaty did not cover the question of minerals is 
because “to do so would be premature.” Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Activities introductory note, June 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 868 (1988), http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/15282.pdf [hereinafter “CRAMA”].  
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to the Antarctic Treaty.”78 The protocol is clear and concise on this issue, 
stating that “[a]ny activity relating to mineral resources, other than 
scientific research, shall be prohibited.”79 However, the lack of agreement 
on a permissive mining regime was not for lack of trying or desire by the 
international community. CRAMRA was convened to establish an 
international mining regime, only to unsuccessfully conclude in 1988 after 
six years of negotiation.80 The six years of negotiation and drafting are 
demonstrative of the fact that a significant portion of the international 
community believes “that participation in Antarctic mineral resource 
activities should be open to all States which have an interest in such 
activities” as well as “that the effective regulation of Antarctic mineral 
resource activities is in the interest of the international community as a 
whole.”81 In this sense, the failure of the international community to arrive 
at a consensus on CRAMRA serves as a cautionary tale, one where all 
property interests in Antarctic resources are necessarily foregone despite 
the desire of many nations to create schemes that allow for such rights.82  
Nonetheless, because CRAMRA is the most expansive attempt at 
legislating mineral extraction in Antarctica, it may aid in interpreting 
similar regulations contained in the USCSLC. Further, the fact that 
CRAMRA provides the most finely-articulated enunciation of the 
conditions under which property rights are allocated makes it especially 
useful for interpreting the meaning of the USCSLC’s guarantee.83 In lieu 
of a direct assertion of property rights, “[t]he Convention makes 
provisions for three levels of mining activities: prospecting, exploration 
 
 
 78. CRAMRA introductory note (CRAMRA was convened to “elaborate a regime governing 
Antarctic mineral resource development should it ever come about.”).  
 79. Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty art. 7, Oct. 4, 1991, 
http://www.ats.aq/documents/recatt/att006_e.pdf. The prohibition on mining was “formalized in the 
1991 Madrid Protocol banning Antarctic mining for fifty years.” Nelson, supra note 62, at 406.  
 80. CRAMRA introductory note. “It was a necessary condition for the entry into force of the 
Convention that all states with claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica should be parties to it. In 
1989 it became apparent that this would not happen.” Id. The treaty fell apart as Australia, whose 
assent was required for the treaty to take effect and was “a leading Antarctic state and one that played 
a key role in the negotiation of the Convention, announced in May 1989 that it [wa]s opposed to the 
Convention and that it would rather support the declaration of Antarctica as a World Park or a 
Wilderness Reserve.” Sam Blay & Ben M. Tsamenyi, Australia and the Convention for the Regulation 
of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA), 26 POLAR REC. 195 (1990).  
 81. CRAMRA pmbl. (recognizing “that Antarctic mineral resource activities could adversely 
affect the Antarctic environment or dependent or associated ecosystems . . .”). 
 82. Id. However, seeing as “practical difficulties and costs of extraction mean that Antarctica is 
not under immediate threat from mineral exploitation,” combined with the substantial environmental 
concerns mining activities in Antarctica would necessarily implicate, it is potentially more appropriate 
that the international community prohibits any mineral extraction. Human Impacts on Antarctica and 
Threats to the Environment- Mining and Oil, COOL ANTARCTICA, http://www.coolantarctica.com/ 
Antarctica%20fact%20file/science/threats_mining_oil.php.  
 83. See generally CRAMRA art. 37. 
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and development.”84 “Mining activities under the Convention are regulated 
through a complex structure of institutions.”85 One of those institutions, 
the Regulatory Committee, is responsible for issuing permits for both the 
exploration and the development of mineral resources.86 Prospecting, on 
the other hand, does not “require authorisation by the institutions” created 
by CRAMRA.87 By allowing for prospecting, exploration, and 
development, CRAMRA implies that the title to resources obtained in the 
course of permitted mineral resource activities could pass to the extracting 
entity, albeit with a significant amount of restrictions and oversight.88 
After all, why would there be a need to create an extensive legislative 
regime governing the extraction of mineral resources if no one could own 
the resources that one managed to extract?  
For this Note’s purposes, CRAMRA’s articulation of what does not 
qualify for property rights protections is more important than CRAMRA’s 
failure to include a specific guarantee of property rights.89 CRAMRA 
 
 
 84. Blay & Tsamenyi, supra note 80, at 196; CRAMRA Chapter III (prospecting); CRAMRA 
Chapter IV (exploration); CRAMRA, Chapter V (development).  
 85. Blay & Tsamenyi supra note 80, at 196 (citations omitted).  
The primary institution of the Convention is the Commission, which is composed of all 
ATCPs [Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties] party to the Convention, sponsoring states 
which are not ATCPs and any parties which may be actively engaged in substantial scientific, 
technical or environmental research in the area to which the Convention applies directly 
relevant to [sic] decisions about Antarctic mineral resource activities.  
Id. ATCPs, or Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, are the primary decision makers on Antarctic 
policy; the qualifications for being an ATCP are that the States must “demonstrate their interest in 
Antarctica by ‘conducting substantial research activity there.’” Parties, SECRETARIAT OF THE 
ANTARCTIC TREATY (last visited Nov. 16, 2015) http://www.ats.aq/devas/ats_parties.aspx?lang=e 
(quoting 12 U.S.T. 794 art. IX.2) (emphasis omitted).  
 86. CRAMRA art. 44, i53. Under the proposal, “[a]t any time during the period in which an 
approved . . . exploration permit [is] in force for an Operator, the Sponsoring State may, on behalf of 
that Operator, lodge with the Regulatory Committee an application for a development permit.” Id. The 
Chairman of the Commission populates a new Regulatory Committee by making “a recommendation 
to the Commission concerning the membership of the regulatory committee [within 90 days] of 
“identification of an area [eligible for permit consideration].” Id. art. 29.3.  
 87. Id. art. 37.2.  
 88. See generally id.  
 89. In addition to governing what an entity must do to be allowed to develop mining activities, 
CRAMRA requires that: 
No Antarctic mineral resource activity shall take place until it is judged, based upon 
assessment of its possible impacts on the Antarctic environment and on dependent and on 
associated ecosystems, that the activity in question would not cause: 
a) significant adverse effects on air and water quality; 
b) significant changes in atmospheric, terrestrial or marine environments; 
c) significant changes in the distribution, abundance or productivity of populations of species 
of fauna or flora; 
d) further jeopardy to endangered or threatened species or populations of such species; or  
e) degradation of, or substantial risk to, areas of special biological, scientific, historic, 
aesthetic or wilderness significance.  
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explicitly establishes that prospecting is not sufficient to establish property 
rights by declaring: “[p]rospecting shall not confer upon any Operator any 
right to Antarctic mineral resources.”90 CRAMRA defines prospecting as: 
[A]ctivities, including logistic support, aimed at identifying areas of 
mineral resource potential for possible exploration and 
development, including geological, geochemical and geophysical 
investigations and field observations, the use of remote sensing 
techniques and collection of surface, seafloor and sub-ice samples. 
Such activities do not include dredging and excavations, except for 
the purpose of obtaining small-scale samples, or drilling, except 
shallow drilling into rock and sediment to depths not exceeding 25 
metres . . . .91 
Considering that prospecting does not confer property rights, its definition 
essentially lists activities which are insufficient to create property rights 
under CRAMRA. This definition implies that the gathering of samples and 
observational testing of an area, no matter how extensive, would never 
have been sufficient under CRAMRA to confer property rights to the 
underlying minerals.92 
Interestingly, the definition of prospecting specifically excludes 
“dredging and excavations, except for the purpose of obtaining small-scale 
samples, or drilling, except shallow drilling into rock and sediment to 
depths not exceeding 25 metres.”93 Instead, these activities are categorized 
as “[e]xploration” under CRAMRA, which is defined as “activities . . . 
aimed at identifying and evaluating specific mineral resource occurrences 
or deposits, including exploratory drilling, dredging and other surface or 
subsurface excavations required to determine the nature and size of 
mineral resource deposits and the feasibility of their development, but 
excluding pilot projects or commercial production.”94 It is possible that the 
definition of prospecting, specifically in regards to what it excludes, was 
meant to delineate the circumstances under which property rights would 
be allocated. In other words, it is possible that when the drafters of 
CRAMRA said that dredging, excavating, and drilling below certain 
depths is not prospecting (keeping in mind that prospecting cannot confer 
property rights in CRAMRA), they did so hoping to establish those 
 
 
Id. art. 4.2. 
 90. Id. art. 37.1. CRAMRA defines “[m]ineral resources” as “all non-living natural non-
renewable resources, including fossil fuels, metallic and non-metallic minerals.” Id. art. 1.6. 
 91. Id. art. 1.8.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. art. 1.9. 
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activities as sufficient to confer property rights.95  
Looking more closely at the definitions of prospecting, exploration, 
and development in CRAMRA, it appears that they may have significant 
implications for how the treaty allocates property rights.96 The definitions 
are meant to provide an exact set of minimum standards that create 
property rights in resources. Under this interpretation, the extracting entity 
has a right to property as soon as its excavations and dredging are no 
longer for the purpose of obtaining “small-scale samples” or when its 
drilling extends to depths below twenty-five meters.97 This means that 
property rights accrue at the exact point where prospecting activities cease 
to be prospecting activities and become exploration or development 
activities. Unlike prospecting, both exploration and development activities 
require the assent, in the form of permits, of the Regulatory Committee 
under CRAMRA.98 Also, unlike prospecting, neither of the provisions on 
exploration or development contain the disclaimer that activities of their 
respective types will not confer property rights on the underlying 
resources. Therefore, this interpretation has intuitive appeal as the point at 
which the Convention implies that the property rights are conferred 
coincides with the point at which international permission is required for 
the activity.  
  
 
 
 95. Id.  
 96. Development is defined as “activities, including logistic support, which take place following 
exploration and are aimed at or associated with exploitation of specific mineral resource deposits, 
including pilot projects, processing, storage and transport activities.” Id. art. 1.10.  
 97. Id. art. 1.8. 
 98. Id. art. 37.2; See also id., Chapter IV (Exploration) & Chapter V (Development).  
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C. Impact of Analogous Resource Paradigms  
UNCLOS and CRAMRA both provide insight into how the USCSLC 
should be interpreted, though their contributions are somewhat conflicting. 
Under both regimes, prospecting is expressly barred from conferring any 
type of property rights in the resources. This principle should be easily 
incorporated into the USCSLC because there is evidence of a consensus in 
the international community that prospecting and sample-gathering are 
insufficient to form the basis of a claim to unextracted resources in 
extraterritorial areas.99 Where the UNCLOS and CRAMRA analyses 
potentially differ is in their treatment of what CRAMRA calls 
“exploration” activities.100 Under CRAMRA, it appears that certain 
activities, can form the basis of a claim in the underlying resources, if they 
are extensive enough and if given permission by the regulatory 
committee.101 UNCLOS has no analogous provision, and it is silent on 
whether activities that go above and beyond prospecting can be construed 
as conferring property rights. UNCLOS, therefore, can only be read as 
asserting that exploration activities cannot form the basis for a property 
rights claim. There are two reasons why the UNCLOS understanding of 
property is more applicable to the USCSLC. First, CRAMRA never went 
into effect, and therefore, its value as a model for space law adaptation is 
lessened.102 Second, CRAMRA creates an extensive series of regulatory 
bodies to oversee and give permission for all mining activities.103 Seeing 
as no such international body exists under the USCSLC, CRAMRA’s 
value as an analogy is further diminished. 
Still, to resolve the remaining question of whether any activity short of 
actual physical removal of the resource from the object can constitute a 
property right claim under the USCSLC, it is useful to examine relevant 
domestic property law provisions. By using the word “obtained,” the 
legislature appears to be invoking the basic property law principle that 
“real estate and substances removed thereon is different” in the eyes of the 
law.104 “While unsevered, minerals form part of the land, and as such are 
real estate. When severed, they become personal chattels.”105 The 
 
 
 99. Additionally, if the SPACE Act was interpreted as asserting that certain prospecting activities 
could be sufficient to form the basis of property rights, then the Act could potentially be legislating 
unextracted resources themselves, which is prohibited by the OST. Letter from Henry Hertzfield, 
supra note 15, at 2. 
 100. CRAMRA, supra note 77, art. 1.10 & Chapter IV.  
 101. See supra notes 86–101 and accompanying text.  
 102. Blay & Tsamenyi, supra note 80. 
 103. Id. at 196. 
 104. Pop, supra note 25, at 135.  
 105. Charles Sweet, A Dictionary of English Law 529 (1882).  
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traditional formulation of this rule, known as the rule of capture, is that 
“one can establish ownership only by capturing or ‘reducing to 
possession’ a flow from the asset.”106 The rule of capture is exemplified by 
wildlife and crude oil: “ownership is established only when a hunter bags 
a goose or when a barrel of oil is brought to the surface. The stock itself, 
be it the population of geese or the oil reservoir, remains unowned.”107 The 
rule of capture, combined with the analysis of comparable international 
property law regimes, tends to show that when Congress uses the word 
“obtains,” it means to expressly preclude property rights claims derived 
from preparatory activity of any kind. Under the USCSLC, an entity 
therefore only has property rights to the physical material that it is able to 
extract from the source.  
The question remains: Is the establishment of property rights in 
extracted space resources desirable? The USCSLC was passed by 
unanimous consent in the Senate and was passed overwhelmingly in the 
House, an impressive feat in a political climate riddled with bipartisan 
gridlock.108 In fact, based on the Congressional Record, those who argued 
against the legislation did so on grounds largely unrelated to the 
establishment of property rights.109 Regardless, many still question the 
wisdom of a U.S. law creating commercial property rights.110 Some 
commentators suggest that the impact of passing the USCSLC will not be 
on international law, but rather on international politics.111 It is also 
reasonable to suggest that the USCSLC could trigger mirroring legislation 
in other space-faring nations, which could create heated competition, 
controversy, and possibly chaos.112 Despite the concerns of some, 
 
 
 106. Dan Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law, 38 J.L. & ECON. 393, 
403–04 (1995). 
 107. Id. at 404. 
 108. See 161 Cong. Rec. H8185-01, H8194 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2015) (letter from Christine 
Anderson, CEO of Spaceport America) (“In May, your original SPACE Act passed the House 284-
133—a 68 percent margin that included 236 Republicans and 48 Democrats. Now that the Senate has 
unanimously supported this bipartisan compromise, we would hope that all 435 House Members could 
vote in the national interest to approve this historic legislation.”).  
 109. See, e.g., id. at H8191 (testimony of Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson) (pointing to 
concerns over certain liability immunities in the bill given to NASA and commercial space entities as 
her rationale to vote against the bill).  
 110. See generally Katrina Pascual, U.S. Space Mining Law is Potentially Dangerous and Illegal: 
How Asteroid Mining Act May Violate International Treaty, TECH TIMES (Nov. 28, 2015), 
http://www.techtimes.com/articles/111534/20151128/u-s-space-mining-law-is-potentially-dangerous-
and-illegal-how-asteroid-mining-act-may-violate-international-treaty.htm. 
 111. Gabrynowicz testimony, supra note 14, at 6 (“The potential legal impact of this kind of 
legislation on international treaties is likely to be modest. The potential political impact of this kind of 
legislation on the international treaties is likely to be sizable.”).  
 112. Nelson, supra note 24 (“The ‘political’ complications bear reflection, especially if rival space 
powers such as Russia, India and China were to enact rival legislation.”).  
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establishing property rights in extracted resources carefully navigates 
international treaties and accomplishes the goal of taking the first major 
step toward the creation of a space resource industry. Since asteroids can 
serve as a water source throughout the galaxy, incentivizing commercial 
asteroid development serves the additional purpose of increasing the 
capacity for human space flight.113 Accordingly, establishing commercial 
property rights in “obtained” resources is a forward-thinking and landmark 
piece of legislation which is necessary for the establishment of an 
industry. The provisions discussed in this Note are worthy of the 
bipartisan support they received.  
III. THE OMISSION OF THE RIGHT TO HARMFUL INTERFERENCE IN THE 
USCSLC; EXAMINING PREVIOUS USCSLC DRAFTS TO UNDERSTAND THE 
RIGHT’S FUTURE 
In addition to the establishment of property rights for extracted space 
resources, the USCSLC asserts that one of the legislation’s goals is to 
prevent those engaged in the commercial recovery of space resources from 
encountering harmful interference from other parties.114 The USCSLC 
mandates that:  
The President, acting through appropriate Federal agencies, shall 
. . . promote the right of United States citizens to engage in 
commercial exploration for and commercial recovery of space 
resources free from harmful interference, in accordance with the 
international obligations of the United States and subject to 
authorization and continuing supervision by the Federal 
Government.115  
Despite the fact that the right to freedom from harmful interference was 
prominently featured in the version of the USCSLC that passed the House, 
the right was relegated to a single mention in the bill that was ultimately 
passed by the Senate and signed by President Obama.116 More importantly, 
the USCSLC does not contain the enforcement provisions present in 
earlier versions.117 The Congressional Record contains no discussion of 
harmful interference or any rationale for why the final draft of the 
USCSLC omitted the enforcement mechanisms present in earlier drafts.118 
 
 
 113. See Steigerwald, supra note 8.  
 114. USCSLC § 51302(a)(3).  
 115. Id. (emphasis added).  
 116. SPACE Act, H.R. 1508, 114th Cong. § 51303(b)–(e) (2015). 
 117. Id.; see generally USCSLC.  
 118. See generally 161 Cong. Rec. H8185-01 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2015). 
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The term “freedom from harmful interference” is a recurring term that was 
present both in bills that inspired the USCSLC and in previous versions of 
the USCSLC itself.119 
However, the term was first used in a space law setting in the OST.120 
In the context of the OST, the principle of avoiding harmful interference 
was “guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance” 
between participating nations.121 If a party to the Treaty “has reason to 
believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer 
space . . . would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of 
other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space . . . 
it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding 
. . . .”122 “Harmful interference” appears to have two connotations within 
the OST. First, the signatories employ the term to prevent the parties from 
interfering with the productive activities of other nation states engaging in 
private endeavors. Second, the term is used to curb the activities of the 
parties that may harm the environment.123  
The term “harmful interference” was first articulated in the United 
States by the ASTEROID Act, which stated that “[a] United States 
commercial asteroid resource utilization entity shall avoid harmful 
interference to other spacecraft.”124 The proposed right was later expanded 
in the SPACE Act. Instead of precluding harmful interference only to 
other spacecraft, it imposed a general duty to “avoid causing harmful 
interference in outer space.”125 In each act, the principle of harmful 
interference is labeled and introduced as a safety measure.126 The creation 
of a new cause of action enforces the right because it creates liability for 
the companies that cause damage to other commercial actors engaging in 
 
 
 119. American Space Technology for Exploring Resource Opportunities in Deep Space Act H.R. 
5063, 113th Cong. § 51302(c) (2014) (never passed in the House) [hereinafter “ASTEROIDS Act”]; 
SPACE Act § 51303(b).  
 120. OST art. IX. 
 121. Id. (“States Parties to the Treaty . . . shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including 
the moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States 
Parties to the Treaty.”).  
 122. Id. The OST also maintains the analogous position that a party to the treaty that “has reason 
to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer space . . . would cause 
potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space . . . 
may request consultation concerning the activity or experiment.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 123. Id. (“States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space . . . and conduct 
exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the 
environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter . . . .”). 
 124. ASTEROIDS Act § 51302(c). 
 125. SPACE Act § 51303(b).  
 126.  In each act, the description of harmful interference is contained in the “Safety of Operations” 
subsection of the bills. ASTEROIDS Act § 51302(b); SPACE Act § 51303(b).  
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commercial enterprises in space.127 
However, when each of the previous acts defined the contours of the 
cause of action, what were ostensibly safety regulations began to exhibit 
property law elements.128 Each bill establishes that a “United States 
commercial space resource utilization entity may bring a civil action for 
appropriate legal or equitable relief, or both . . . for any action by another 
entity subject to United States jurisdiction causing harmful interference to 
its operations with respect to an asteroid resource utilization activity in 
outer space.”129 Each bill goes on to provide a similar three-element 
threshold test to determine if an entity is eligible to assert the cause of 
action.130 The more recent SPACE Act requires the plaintiff to show that 
the entity “(A) acted in accordance with all existing international 
obligations of the United States; and (B) was first in time to conduct the 
activity,” in addition to proving that the activity itself “is reasonable for 
the exploration and utilization of asteroid resources.”131 One difference 
between the two tests is that the ASTEROIDS Act only requires that the 
activity be “derived upon a reasonable basis,”132 instead of being 
reasonably related to the specific purpose of “exploration and utilization” 
of asteroid resources.133 
Considering the novelty of the regulation, it is necessary to address the 
legality of such a provision before proceeding to an investigation into the 
implications of creating a harmful interference cause of action.134 Some 
may argue that the inception of the harmful interference cause of action is 
an assertion of jurisdiction over the disputed asteroid.135 Regardless, the 
right to freedom from harmful interference is most likely compliant with 
U.S. treaty obligations and the OST.136 It is compliant because neither the 
SPACE Act nor the ASTEROIDS Act “grant U.S. jurisdiction to an 
asteroid or any asteroid resource.”137 Instead, they “grant U.S. jurisdiction 
 
 
 127. SPACE Act § 51303(c); ASTEROIDS Act § 51302(b).  
 128. SPACE Act § 51303(d); ASTEROIDS Act § 51302(c).  
 129. SPACE Act § 51303(c); ASTEROIDS Act § 51302(d). The proposed cause of action does 
not contain a requirement that the conduct be intentional or negligent, and it seems to create strict 
liability for individuals causing harmful interference.  
 130. SPACE Act § 51303(d); ASTEROIDS Act § 51302(b).  
 131. SPACE Act § 51303(d). The SPACE Act also mandates that “[t]he district courts of the 
United States shall have original jurisdiction over an action under this chapter without regard to the 
amount in controversy.” Id. at § 51303(e). 
 132. ASTEROIDS Act § 51302(b).  
 133. SPACE Act § 51303(d)(2). 
 134. Letter from Henry Hertzfield, supra note 15, at 2–6 (responding to allegations that the 
SPACE Act violates the OST because it asserts U.S. jurisdiction in outer space).  
 135. See id.  
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. at 2. 
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to companies that fall under U.S. jurisdiction . . . with the intent of 
adjudicating claims of ‘harmful interference’ between those 
companies.”138 Therefore, if a right to be free from harmful interference 
were to become U.S. law, the United States would not be claiming that it 
has jurisdiction over any space territory, which the OST would prohibit.139 
Instead, the bills are invoking the United States’ right to personal 
jurisdiction over its subjects, entitling it to regulate “conduct in the 
extraterrestrial realms, and in regard to the extraterrestrial realms.”140 This 
right is well-recognized and uncontested.141 The concern that the creation 
of a cause of action that protects the right to be free from harmful 
interference from one’s competitors might violate the OST would be 
further mitigated by the express disclaimer contained in the USCSLC 
which specifically asserts that the bill contains no claim of sovereignty.142  
While it appears that the creation of a new cause of action protecting 
commercial actors’ rights to freedom from harmful interference from their 
competitors comports with international law, the implications of such a 
cause of action may be broader than initially revealed by a cursory 
investigation. In order to determine the impact of the legislation, it is 
necessary to answer two related questions. First, at what point do the 
protections attach to a mining enterprise? Second, when does an activity 
undertaken by a competitor become actionable under the statute?  
The first question, determining when an enterprise accrues the 
protections guaranteed by the proposed cause of action, is answered by 
examining the conditions under which the protections of the statute 
attach.143 In order for a commercial mining enterprise to receive the 
protections under the hypothetical causes of action in each statute, the 
activity must be in accordance with U.S. international obligations, “first in 
time”, and reasonable.144 The first of these requirements, that the activity 
 
 
 138. Id. Going one step further, “[p]rotecting entities from ‘harmful interference’ is consistent 
with, and indeed furthers, the purposes of the OST, that requires ‘due regard’ be given to other’s space 
activities and requires advance consultations if a proposed activity ‘would cause potentially harmful 
interference.’” Id.  
 139.  Pop, supra note 25, at 34.  
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. at 34–35 (“Thus, the 1967 and 1979 documents are not called ‘Treaty on the legal status 
of outer space’ and ‘Agreement on the legal status of the Moon,’ but ‘Treaty on Principles Governing 
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies’ and ‘Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies.’”).  
 142. USCSLC § 403.  
 143. SPACE Act § 51303(d). 
 144. Id.; ASTEROIDS Act § 51302(b). The SPACE Act also specifies that each party in the action 
must be considered a “United States commercial space resource utilization entity,” which is defined as 
“an entity providing space resource exploration or utilization services, the control of which is held by 
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is consistent with international obligations, would not have a meaningful 
impact on which asteroid mining activities gain the protections of the 
statute.145 The third requirement, that the activity is reasonable for the 
exploration and utilization of asteroid resources, similarly is unlikely to 
affect the claims of any party who is actually eligible to assert a cause of 
action.146 
The requirement that the activity be “first in time,” on the other hand, 
would result in the cause of action—what is supposed to be a safety 
regulation—having significant property law consequences.147 Without 
considering the implications of the creation of a right to freedom from 
harmful interference, property interests only accrue under the USCSLC at 
the moment a given resource is reduced to possession.148 In other words, 
the USCSLC contains no mechanism for a prepossessory interest in an 
asteroid or asteroid resources.149 If a commercial actor’s substantial 
activity can trigger certain safety-oriented protections before possession, 
then, by definition, the cause of action has created a type of 
“prepossessory interest” in the enterprise.150 The prepossessory interest 
 
 
persons other than a Federal, State, local, or foreign government.” SPACE Act § 51301(4). The term 
also requires that the company be subject to U.S. jurisdiction either legally or voluntarily. Id. 
§ 51301(4)(A)–(C).  
 145. Recall that the USCSLC contained a provision declaring that authorizing the commercial 
ownership of space resources is not an assertion of sovereignty or jurisdiction over celestial bodies. 
USCSLC § 403. Therefore, according to Congress, any activities that are limited to resource 
extraction, and have been properly licensed, will be considered consistent with U.S. international 
obligations. Id.  
 146. The SPACE Act bars all parties from bringing a harmful interference suit unless the entity 
bringing suit is providing space resource exploration or utilization services. SPACE Act § 51303(c). 
As a result, as long as the company qualifies as a commercial space resource entity, its normal 
business operations should generally meet the standard of reasonableness for the exploration and 
utilization of asteroid resources. The reasonableness standard is even easier to satisfy in the 
ASTEROIDS Act, which only requires that the activity be “derived upon a reasonable basis.” 
ASTEROIDS Act § 51302(b).  
 147. SPACE Act § 51303(d); ASTEROIDS Act § 51302(b).  
 148. See supra Part. II (discussing property rights under the USCSLC). 
 149. See supra Part II. Here, property law surrounding lost or abandoned property can serve as a 
useful analogy for space law: “[t]he law protects not only the title finally acquired by one who finds 
lost or abandoned property but also the right of the person who discovers such property, and is actively 
and ably engaged in reducing it to possession, to complete this project without interference from 
another.” Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 640 F. 2d 
560, 572 (1981). “[I]n order to acquire a legally cognizable interest in lost or abandoned property a 
finder need not always have ‘manual’ possession of the thing. Rather, a finder may be protected by 
taking such constructive possession of the property as its ‘nature and situation’ permit.” Id.  
 150. SPACE Act § 51303(d). The court in Pierson v. Post first established a prepossessory 
interest: “actual bodily seizure is not indispensable to acquire right to, or possession of, wild beasts; 
but that, on the contrary, the mortal wounding of such beasts, by one not abandoning his pursuit, may 
. . . be deemed possession of him . . . .” Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). The 
notion later expanded to include when an entity “undertakes significant but incomplete steps to 
achieve possession of a piece of . . . property and the effort is interrupted by the unlawful acts of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss1/8
 
 
 
 
 
2016] U.S. COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH COMPETITIVENESS ACT 25 
 
 
 
 
implicated by the potential harmful interference cause of action is 
analogous to the traditional formulations of the term, all of which create an 
actual recognizable property right.151 Rights derived from a harmful 
interference cause of action cannot therefore technically be considered a 
prepossessory interest, as the protections confer no actual property 
rights.152 The cause of action may nonetheless function in much the same 
way by giving legal protections to actors who have taken substantial steps 
toward, yet have not completed, extracting resources. 
Considering the “first in time” requirement is likely to be the operative 
condition of the SPACE Act’s harmful interference provision, the 
proposed statute may give actors exclusive rights to space objects simply 
by being the first enterprise to reach a certain prepossessory benchmark.153 
The questions then become: What type of activities will be proscribed by 
the statute? How is harmful interference defined? Defining harmful 
interference will determine the extent of the protections given to 
enterprises before extraction of resources. The notion of “harm” in the 
space context is a very different concept than the notion of “harm” in the 
Earth context.154 Space is a far more dangerous place for man and machine 
alike.155 As a result, even the smallest amount of activity undertaken by a 
competitor in the same vicinity as an enterprise that has reached a specific 
location first would have the potential to harmfully interfere with the 
actions of the “first in time” party. It is even plausible that asteroid 
landings are so tenuous and the enterprise so generally dangerous—for 
both the people and the technology involved—that any targeting of the 
 
 
others.” Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002 WL 31833731, at 6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002).  
 151. See supra note 150.  
 152. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (establishing “harmful interference” as a safety 
measure). 
 153. See supra notes 143–144 and accompanying text for why the “first in time” requirement is 
determinative. 
 154. Dara O Briain, What Makes Space Travel So Dangerous? BBC IWONDER, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/guides/zctgq6f (last visited July 18, 2016) (“We were made to live on Earth, not 
in the extreme conditions we find in space. So when astronauts . . . leave our planet they have to take 
their environment with them.” “[A]stronauts might experience temperatures as low as [-200F] and as 
high as [250F] . . . .”); Asteroid Mining: The Most Dangerous Job In the Solar System, COLONY 
WORLDS (July 11, 2007), http://colonyworlds.com/2007/07/asteroid-mining-the-most-dangerous-job-
in-the-solar-system.html (“Another danger of asteroid miners will be radiation. Since most . . . 
asteroids lack a magnetic field, asteroid outposts will be at the mercy of the Sun’s wrath, not to 
mention cosmic rays . . . .” “[M]iners also face the dangers of micrometeorites piercing holes through 
their suits and stations or . . . encountering a meteor shower from an incoming comet.”).  
 155. Risk Assessment Improves the Entire Project’s Chance of Success, MUNICH RE, 
https://www.munichre.com/touch/space/en/spectrum-of-services/space-risk-assessment/index.html 
(last visited July 18, 2016) (“Once . . . in orbit, it is too late to carry out any repairs. Any damage that 
occurs in orbit can have a devastating effect. Even minor damage can lead to a total loss and to the 
failure of the entire project.”).  
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same asteroid would result in the potential to implicate harmful 
interference concerns.156  
Thus, the first enterprise to land on an asteroid could effectively lay 
claim to that asteroid under the pretense that any other operations targeting 
that asteroid would potentially harmfully interfere with the original 
mission.157 As a result, for every commercial activity in space, a zone of 
danger will need to be established with the goal of demarcating the point 
where activity within a certain distance presents too great a risk of harmful 
interference to authorize any activity. Regardless of where the boundaries 
are drawn, the zone of danger will necessarily be coterminous with a 
newly formed quasi-property right. For example, say a court rules that 
coming within five hundred feet of an asteroid probe is too dangerous and 
thus poses an impermissible risk of harmful interference. Then the entity 
that simply lands a probe on an asteroid effectively has exclusive domain 
over the five hundred feet of land and, by extension, the underlying 
resources.158 While the OST does not fully address the issue of extracted 
space minerals, the treaty is very clear that property claims over plots of 
land and entire celestial bodies are forbidden.159 Therefore, the unintended 
potential consequences of a harmful interference cause of action may  
circumvent the intentions of the OST.160 
Nonetheless, the right to freedom from harmful interference as 
articulated by the SPACE Act and ASTEROIDS Act, or a similar statute, 
should inevitably become a crucial component of regulating commercial 
action in space.161 The USCSLC already articulates the broader goal that 
commercial actors should be free to pursue business enterprises in space 
unencumbered by the interference of other actors.162 Furthermore, the fact 
that Congress has already considered such a provision is evidence that the 
 
 
 156. The cause of action allows for “appropriate legal or equitable relief, or both.” In other words, 
it is possible that companies are eligible to recover damages after the fact, or stop other companies 
from taking action in the first place. SPACE Act § 51303(c). The language used in the SPACE Act 
that allows an entity to bring an action against another entity that “caus[es] harmful interference to its 
operations with respect to an asteroid resource utilization activity in outer space,” implicates human, 
mechanical, and property components of the operations. Id.  
 157. Id.  
 158. At this point in time, it is impossible to determine what a realistic zone of danger might 
encompass. Given the dangers and difficulties of space, see supra notes 154–153, it is plausible to 
imagine that zones of danger—even if reasonably based on technological necessities—could result in 
de facto property rights for large swaths of mineral-rich and valuable land.  
 159. See supra Introduction. 
 160. Though the legislative record contains no discussion of the topic, the notion that a fully 
fledged harmful interference law might conflict with the OST is one possible explanation for the action 
being omitted in the final version of the bill. 
 161. Id.; SPACE Act § 51303(d); ASTEROIDS Act § 51302(b). 
 162. USCSLC § 51302(a)(1)–(3).  
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proposal is responsive to an issue that requires attention.163 More 
importantly, a harmful interference statute—in some form—is inevitable 
for the simple reason that it is necessary. The OST mandates that no 
individual country can have jurisdiction over space itself, creating a 
scenario where regulating space issues is largely dependent on 
international agreement.164 Therefore, “[o]ne of the greatest known 
challenges to legislating and regulating [the space industry] is establishing 
uniform licensing and regulations of the activities on-orbit and at the 
asteroid.”165 One major exception to this rule is that individual countries 
are allowed to regulate and supervise the activities of non-governmental 
entities in outer space.166 The only way for the United States to protect 
commercial space operations that its citizens undertake is to create an 
entirely new cause of action. Seeing as Congress already has declared an 
intention to protect the rights of its citizens to engage in space resource 
exploitation,167 it is only a matter of time before the harmful interference 
cause of action resurfaces. Regulating the safety in the nascent space 
mining industry will be of paramount importance as the industry 
approaches feasibility. Despite the unintended property consequences of 
protecting commercial actors against harmful interference, implementing 
effective safety protections should be the prevailing concern.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
To many, the prospect of mining asteroids is closer to science fiction 
than reality. In truth, there are many technological hurdles to overcome 
before the space resource industry comes to fruition. Still, the potential 
rewards associated with asteroid mining are quite literally astronomical. 
Perhaps more importantly, the ability to harvest asteroids for water and 
fuel could be one of the biggest advances in our capacity to survive and 
travel deep into space. The USCSLC incentivizes commercial actors to 
develop the technology to extract resources from asteroids by giving 
enterprises the rights to the tremendous abundance of precious minerals 
contained within them. The involvement of the private sector will be 
crucial in attaining the technology not only for asteroid mining but for all 
 
 
 163. SPACE Act § 51303(d); ASTEROIDS Act § 51302(b).  
 164. OST art. III; Gabrynowicz testimony, supra note 14, at 4 (“Space, itself, is a global commons 
and is governed by international law.”).  
 165. Gabrynowicz testimony, supra note 14, at 4.  
 166. In fact, regulation and supervision of the private actors that operate in space is pursuant to an 
obligation imposed by the OST. OST art. VI; Gabrynowicz testimony, supra note 14, at 5 (also noting 
that “[t]he United States meets this obligation through Federal licensing regulations.”). 
 167. USCSLC § 51302(a)(1)–(3).  
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facets of space travel. The USCSLC is congressional recognition that the 
establishment of property rights for commercial actors is a step that needs 
to be taken long before entities are ready to launch mining missions. 
Without the legal certainty that asteroid mining can result in the 
acquisition of property, there will never be the requisite financial support 
to catalyze the space resource industry. While the USCSLC is a good start, 
it fell short of all that it could have established. A cause of action 
protecting the right to freedom from harmful interference for space-faring 
U.S. companies was discussed and ultimately dismissed from the bill. 
Such a provision is an inevitable addition U.S. lawmakers will need to 
make and include in future space legislation. However, since enforcement 
mechanisms for the right to freedom from harmful interference may have 
unintended property consequences, it may be wiser to refine the cause of 
action prior to it becoming law. The USCSLC proves that US 
policymakers have embraced the fact that, when it comes to space, the 
technological advancements of tomorrow are borne out of the regulatory 
foundation of today.  
Elliot Reaven* 
 
 
* J.D. (2017), Washington University in St. Louis; B.A. (2013), Philosophy, George 
Washington University. I would like to thank the Washington University Law Review members, 
editors, and staff for their diligent work on my Note. In particular, I would like to thank Jenney Terrell 
for her guidance and advice throughout the writing process. I would also like to thank Professor 
Matthew Schaefer for his help in refining the Note topic and his high-level contributions to the 
direction of the piece. Finally, thanks to all my friends and family for their support and for entertaining 
my desires to constantly talk about space.  
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss1/8
